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John Keown has constructed a logical slippery slope argument from voluntary euthanasia 
(VAE) to non-voluntary euthanasia (NVAE). VAE if justified implies that death can be of 
overall benefit, in which case it should also be facilitated in those who cannot consent 
(NVAE). Hallvard Lillehammer asserts that Keown’s argument rests on a fallacy. However, 
pace Lillehammer, it can be restated to escape this fallacy. Its validity is confirmed by 
applying to VAE some well-established general principles of medical decision making. Thus, 
either VAE and NVAE must be accepted together or, if NVAE is regarded as unacceptable, 
VAE should also be rejected. 
 
Slippery slope arguments in the history of the euthanasia debate  
 
Slippery Slope arguments have been important in the euthanasia debate for at least half a 
century. In 1957 the Cambridge legal scholar Glanville Williams wrote a controversial book, 
The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, in which he presented the decriminalising of 
euthanasia as a modern liberal proposal taking its rightful place alongside proposals to 
decriminalise contraception, sterilisation, abortion, and attempted suicide (all of which the 
book also advocated).i Opposition to these reforms was in turn presented as exclusively 
religious and particularly Roman Catholic. Thus Williams asserted that “euthanasia can be 
condemned only according to religious opinion” (1957, p. 312).  
 
The following year, in response to this book Yale Kamisar, then associate professor of law at 
Minnesota wrote a substantial paper entitled, “Some Non-Religious Views against Proposed 
‘Mercy Killing’ Legislation”. Kamisar did not accept Williams’ assertion that euthanasia could 
only be rejected on the basis of religious arguments. Kamisar wrote as “a non-Catholic and 
self-styled liberal” (1958, p. 974) and appealed exclusively to “utilitarian ethics” (1958, p. 
974 n. 21). The fundamental argument of his paper invoked what he called the “wedge 
principle” and would later be called the “slippery slope” argument. He urged that in practice 
permitting “mercy killing” would not be confined to voluntary euthanasia but that pressure 
would be put on the vulnerable to end their lives and the incompetent would be killed 
without their consent. Williams replied (1958). 
 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence either of Glanville Williams’ book or of 
Kamisar’s rebuttal in the debate over legalisation of euthanasia. These set the terms of the 
debate for much of the next fifty years. Following Williams, euthanasia, and latterly 
physician assisted suicide, another form of “medically assisted dying”, have continued to be 
advocated as progressive causes, and opposition has continued to be caricatured as 
exclusively religious (Battin 1998). Following Kamisar, the dominant political argument 
against changing the law has been based on some form of slippery slope (Gay‑Williams 
1983; Gelfand 1984).ii  
 
The major change between the Kamisar / Williams debate and contemporary slippery slope 
arguments on euthanasia is that since 1984, there has been a major jurisdiction that has 
2 
 
tolerated voluntary euthanasia: the Netherlands. This legal toleration was subsequently 
formalised through statute and other jurisdictions have also brought in legislation for 
euthanasia (Belgium and Luxembourg) or physician assisted suicide (Oregon and 
Washington). These legal changes allow the predictions of Kamisar and others to be tested 
empirically. Does evidence from these countries bear out the presence of a slippery slope, 
or, on the contrary, does it demonstrate that euthanasia or physician assisted suicide can be 
regulated effectively without adverse effects on the vulnerable, on those who cannot 
consent, or on standards of palliative care? 
 
In principle it would seem straightforward to evaluate the empirical evidence for or against 
a slippery slope. In practice this is complicated by many factors, not least the difficulty of 
international comparisons or of discovering how much practice falls outside regulations and 
reporting (before and after legalisation) (for some discussion of these difficulties see for 
example Lewis 2007). Furthermore, the evidence that has been collated provides such an 
embarrassment of riches (thousands of cases a year analysable in many different ways) that 
advocates and opponents both have some scope to see in the data the conclusions they 
wish to see.  
 
There is, perhaps unsurprisingly, little sign as yet of a consensus as to the interpretation of 
this data. Even where opponents can show clear abuse (for example the thousand plus 
deaths a year without consent uncovered by the first Remmelink Report (Amarasekara and 
Bagaric 2001, p. 188; Keown 1995, p. 269; Keown 2002, p. 94)), this does not show that the 
abuse was due to the legalisation of euthanasia, still less does it show that euthanasia will 
necessarily cause such abuse. Similarly, even where proponents can show evidence of a 
decline in reported cases between two well-chosen points (as is possible, for example, in the 
Netherlands between 2001 and 2005) this does not show that the underlying trend is 
downwards nor does it show that there is not a slippage in some other respect, for example 
in relation to the categories of patients affected. Finally both opponents and proponents 
face the difficulty of integrating recorded data on voluntary euthanasia and non-consensual 
life-termination with the growth or decline in what are often seen as separate practices, 
such as withdrawal of treatment or terminal sedation, sometimes with the aim of ending 
life. Advocates and opponents of euthanasia are thus in a continual struggle to out-narrate 
one another and to show that taken as a whole this great human experiment is either a 
reassuring success or is a salutary warning.  
 
Without understating the importance of continued empirical research on euthanasia and 
continued analysis of new data, there is an evident need for supplementary arguments 
which could give clarity to this debate. Just as data from epidemiology needs to be 
supplemented by research into the biochemistry and causal workings of disease, so 
empirical research into an alleged “slippery slope” needs to be supplemented by rigorous 
analysis of the logic of the policy and its implications. In a short but clear-sighted article in 
1971 Paul Ramsey drew attention to the role of “principle” in slippery slope arguments. 
“There is always some principle behind the wedge hammering it in… some flaw in moral 
reasoning… urges us down slippery slopes.” (1971, p. 11) The principle at stake, that is, the 
inner logic of a proposal, provides a credible mechanism for a slippery slope argument. 
Thus, in addition to empirical slippery slope arguments based on prediction (before the fact) 
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or reported evidence (after the fact), it is possible to construct “logical slippery slope” 
arguments which begin with an analysis of the proposal and aim to demonstrate that this 
leads logically to an unacceptable conclusion. This paper will examine a recent example of a 
logical slippery slope argument about euthanasia, but before considering this particular 
argument it is helpful to consider the slippery slope as a form of argument more generally. 
 
The validity of slippery slope arguments 
 
Slippery slope arguments take the form,  
 
we should resist some practice or policy [at the top of the slope] on the grounds that 
allowing it could lead us to allow some other practice or policy that is clearly 
objectionable [at the bottom of the slope]. (Lode 1999, p. 1471)  
 
Between top and bottom may be many little steps, many gradations, and the slope is 
slippery because it is impossible to decide “where do you draw the line?” (Schauer 1985, p. 
378) If we step on to the top of the slope then we find ourselves sliding inexorably towards 
the bottom.  Slippery slope arguments (or a different metaphor for the same kind of 
argument is “the thin end of the wedge”, or again “opening the floodgates”) are extremely 
common in politics and in practical ethics. Eric Lode cites examples of such arguments used 
to oppose,  
 
gun control legislation, prohibitions on flag burning, the banning of racist ‘hate 
speech’ on college campuses, decriminalizing marijuana, requiring HIV-positive 
physicians to disclose their HIV status to their patients… abortion, human gene 
therapy, [and] various kinds of searches and seizures conducted without a valid 
warrant. (Lode 1999, pp. 1472-1473)  
 
It would not be difficult to add to the list. Politicians and commentators both on the left and 
on the right use “where do you stop?” arguments to defend the status quo against moves 
that they believe will have bad consequences further down the line. Nevertheless, while 
common in popular debate, slippery slope arguments “have a bad philosophical reputation” 
(Enoch 2001, p. 629) and logicians often include “the slippery slope” in lists of fallacies. This 
is because the greater the number of steps, the less secure the path from A to B. A good 
example of this is a speech made by Clarence Darrow in the famous Scopes “monkey trial” 
of 1925. 
 
If today you can take a thing like evolution and make it a crime to teach it in the 
public school, tomorrow you can make it a crime to teach it in the private schools, 
and the next year you can make it a crime to teach it to the hustings or in the church. 
At the next session you may ban books and the newspapers. Soon you may set 
Catholic against Protestant and Protestant against Protestant, and try to foist your 
own religion upon the minds of men. If you can do one you can do the other. 
Ignorance and fanaticism is ever busy and needs feeding. Always it is feeding and 
gloating for more. Today it is the public school teachers, tomorrow the private. The 
next day the preachers and the lectures, the magazines, the books, the newspapers. 
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After [a]while, your honor, it is the setting of man against man and creed against 
creed until with flying banners and beating drums we are marching backward to the 
glorious ages of the sixteenth century when bigots lighted fagots to burn the men 
who dared to bring any intelligence and enlightenment and culture to the human 
mind. (Moran 2002, p. 92) 
 
While this is a great piece of rhetoric, a moment’s reflection is enough to make us doubt 
that a restriction on what is taught in a state school in America in the twentieth century 
would in fact lead inexorably to burning people for heresy. In this example many of the 
steps are unconvincing but even if each had more plausibility, the sheer number of steps 
makes the argument as a whole implausible.  
 
On the other hand while some examples of slippery slope arguments are implausible and 
exaggerated rhetoric, there are significant changes that happen gradually where the first 
small step has been an important stage in the establishment of a much bigger change. 
Volokh illustrates this by juxtaposing two judgements (Volokh 2003, p. 1136): 
 
Sandra Starr, vice chairwoman of the Princeton Regional Health Commission . . ., said 
there is no “slippery slope” toward a total ban on smoking in public places. “The 
commission’s overriding concern,” she said, “is access to the machines by minors.” 
 
New York Times, Sept. 5, 1993, § 1, at 52. 
 
Last month, the Princeton Regional Health Commission took a bold step to protect 
its citizens by enacting a ban on smoking in all public places of accommodation, 
including restaurants and taverns. . . . In doing so, Princeton has paved the way for 
other municipalities to institute similar bans . . . . 
 
The Record (Bergen County), July 12, 2000, at L7. 
 
This can also be seen by considering the strategy of someone who wants to effect a major 
change. If it is not possible to effect change all at once (in Volokh’s example, a ban on 
smoking in public places) reformers might first attempt to make some seemingly 
insignificant change (restricting the access to cigarette machines) and then use this as a 
precedent for further changes. If this “device of stages” is a good strategy for someone who 
wishes to effect a major change then concern about “where this will all lead” is at least 
sometimes a good reason for resisting a seemingly insignificant change (Enoch 2001, p. 
634). As Sissela Bok remarked, if slippery slope is an argument for caution sometimes that 
caution is justifiable. (1971, p. 11)  
 
Hence despite an evident distaste among some philosophers for this “rather shady” 
(Dworkin 1990, p. 42; Whitman 1994, p. 85) style of argument, there is a general if reluctant 
(e.g. Enoch 2001; LaFollette 2005) consensus in the philosophical literature that empirical 
slippery slope arguments can be valid and many regard them as useful (Govier, 1982; Lamb 
1988; van der Burg 1991; Williams 1995; Lode 1999; Volokh 2003). These arguments are 
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valid, insofar as there is good reason to think that the policy under consideration will in fact 
make more likely the establishment of an objectionable policy.  
 
Logically slippery slopes 
 
In addition to such “causal” (Johnson and Blair 1977, pp. 163-169), “psychological” (Rachels 
1986a, pp. 172-173), or “empirical” (Glover 1977, pp. 165-168) slippery slope arguments, 
philosophers commonly describe at least two forms of logical slippery slope. The first is 
what Trudy Govier calls the conceptual, “relating to vagueness” (1982, p. 303). This Glover 
(1977, p. 166) and Walton (1992, ch. 2) simply call “the logical slippery slope”, and van der 
Burg calls it “L2”: his second kind of logical slippery slope (1991, p. 62). This argument rests 
on the claim that where there are a number of small steps, none of which is significant in 
itself, then there is no way to distinguish between the very first and the very last stage. If 
you take the first step then you have no reason to stop until you reach the last step. This is 
sometimes illustrated by a gruesome (though seemingly mythical) experiment in which a 
bucket of water containing frogs is gradually heated. The bucket is set up so that the frogs 
can jump out at any point, but if the temperature is raised each time by only tiny amounts 
then there is never a change that is big enough to trigger the frogs to act. The result, so goes 
the cautionary tale, is that some frogs stay in the bucket until they are boiled to death.  
 
This form of argument is analogous to the ancient “sorites paradox”: that taking one grain of 
sand makes no difference to a heap – it was a heap before and will be a heap afterwards – 
but if you carry on taking away one grain at a time then eventually there will be no heap at 
all! (Williamson 1994, ch. 1) There is never a single point when the heap ceases to be a 
heap, and there is no obvious place to draw a line, but you know that if you keep taking 
grains away then it will cease to be a heap. Govier gives a similar example: one hair more or 
less does not make the difference between being bald and not being bald but nevertheless if 
you lose all your hair one hair at a time then you will become bald (1982, p. 304).  
 
The sorities paradox relies on the fact that there is no non-arbitrary place to draw a line 
when applying the somewhat vague concepts of ordinary life – like heaps and baldness. 
Nevertheless, in practical matters this problem can be solved by drawing a line that has an 
element of arbitrariness. Arbitrariness is unreasonable or unfair where there is a clear 
reason to choose one thing rather than another, but in the absence of clarity it is not 
unreasonable to draw a somewhat arbitrary line. Better this than no line. This can be 
illustrated by the example of speed limits: “A supporter of the logical version of the wedge 
argument might argue that either we should ban cars altogether or else allow driving at any 
speed anywhere.” (Glover 1977, p.166). This example shows that the conceptual form of 
logical slippery slope is a fallacy. Even though one mile-an-hour more or less makes little 
difference this is not a valid argument against setting a speed limit. Speed limits are set by 
an imprecise balancing of danger and inconvenience and then rounded up or down 
(significantly, whether in miles-per-hour or kilometres-per-hour, speed limits are generally 
some multiple of five). This is clearly a useful thing to do notwithstanding the fact that there 
is some element of arbitrariness in where precisely the line is drawn. The conceptual 
slippery slope may represent a practical danger – that people will fail to draw a line because 
they are not forced to do so at any particular point – but this danger can be addressed 
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reasonably by deciding in advance on arbitrary lines. As John Harris says, “slopes are only 
slippery if they catch us unawares and we have strayed onto them inadequately equipped” 
(1985, p. 127). Hence, whereas empirical slippery slope arguments can be valid if they are 
well grounded, a logical slippery slope argument that relies on conceptual vagueness is 
never valid: it is a fallacy.  
 
A second form of logical slippery slope is the precedential “relating to the need to treat 
similar cases consistently” (Govier 1982, p. 303). This is what James Rachels refers to as “the 
logical slippery slope’” (1986a, p. 72) and what van der Burg calls “L1”: the first kind of 
logical slippery slope argument (1991, p. 44). This seems to be what Ramsey had in mind 
when he wrote that there is “always some principle behind the wedge hammering it in” 
(1971, p. 11). Such arguments rest on the claim that the justification for A will also apply to 
B. If we accept A then this is a “precedent” for accepting B.  
 
Some people have disputed that this is really a slippery slope argument, preferring to call it 
an argument from consistency (Enoch 2001, p. 644; Smith 2005, p. 229) or an appeal to 
pernicious precedent (Den Hartogh 2009) or reductio ad absurdum. Nevertheless, it has a 
family resemblance to other forms of the slippery slope argument, and is commonly 
categorised together with them. Govier points out that it is often combined with a causal 
slippery slope argument, so that the force of the precedent is (at least in part) a cause that 
leads people down the slope to more objectionable practices (1982, p. 313). In any case it is 
difficult to see what is at stake in the debate over which arguments are called slippery slope 
arguments or whether they should be called something else. The key question is whether a 
precedential slippery slope argument can be valid and several authors argue convincingly 
that can be. Van der Burg puts the matter with admirable clarity: “Whenever it is 
demonstrated that there are no relevant differences between A and B and that B is clearly 
morally wrong, this is a valid and conclusive reason to reject A as well.” (1991, p. 45) 
 
There is a strong reason for saying that logical slippery slope arguments that appeal to 
precedent or consistency can be valid, inasmuch as the same justification that applies to A 
also applies to B. Nevertheless, a number of authors have contended that this logical 
slippery slope argument is also a fallacy.  The argument is set up so that the first step A is 
prima facie acceptable whereas the conclusion B is clearly objectionable. This is the whole 
point of using a slippery slope argument rather than examining the morality of A in its own 
right. Yet if there is an apparent difference between A and B this will be enough to 
contradict the premise that there are “no relevant differences” between A and B.  As Govier 
argues, “if [A] is acceptable and the others are not, then there must be a relevant difference 
between them” (1982, p. 310). This point is reiterated by Enoch, “that like cases ought to be 
treated alike cannot serve as a justification for moving from the permissible A to the 
impermissible Z- because A and Z are not like cases” (Enoch 2001, p. 645 emphasis added, 
see also Lode 1999, p. 1487; Rachels 1986b, pp. 69-70). 
 
If the logical slippery slope did indeed move from a permissible A to an impermissible Z then 
there would seem to be some relevant difference between A and Z, as Govier and Enoch 
assert. However, pace Govier and Enoch, this kind of argument need not start with a 
commitment to A being in fact permissible. The argument need only start with A not yet 
7 
 
agreed to be impermissible, much as all reductio ad absurdum arguments start by accepting 
the premise for the sake of the argument until it is shown to result in an absurdity. This 
point needs to be understood when characterising slippery slope arguments in general, as 
noted by van der Burg (1991, p.42):  
 
The basic structure of the argument is rather simple: if we allow A, B will necessarily 
or very likely follow (for A and B we can fill in certain acts or practices like 
euthanasia); B is morally not acceptable; therefore, we must not allow A either. 
Sometimes a further requirement is added: that A is in itself morally neutral or even 
justifiable. This does not seem to me a useful qualification: often the question is 
precisely whether A is justifiable, because the proposed principles that seem to 
justify A would justify B as well, and might therefore not be sound after all. 
 
The premise that “the proposed principles that seem to justify A would justify B as well” 
forms the basis of a precedential logical slippery argument. This could be expressed as 
“there are no relevant differences between A and B” (e.g. van der Burg 1991, p.45) but it 
then becomes difficult to determine what counts as “relevant” differences. The key point is 
rather to establish a relevant similarity on the matter of ethical principle. If accepting A 
involves accepting principle X, and if principle X also justifies B, then accepting A will make it 
more likely that B will be accepted, notwithstanding that there may also be significant 
differences between A and B.  
 
It may be objected that a logical slippery slope is of no practical concern because people are 
often inconsistent and are not led primarily by logic. Furthermore, “whether the arguments 
do have this [social] force clearly depends on empirical processes” (van de Burg 1991, p.48). 
Nevertheless, while there are many non-rational forces in society that influence actions, 
these other forces are not consistent or reliable. In contrast the inner rationale of a policy or 
proposal will create a constant and consistent pressure in a particular direction. The logical 
slippery slope explains the gravity that pulls us down the slope. We noted above the view of 
John Harris that “slopes are only slippery if they catch us unawares” (1985, p. 127), but this 
is true only for the empirical slippery slope, or the conceptual kind of logical slippery slope 
argument. If the slope is a valid precedential logical slippery slope then it will be our very 
reasoning that impels us down the slope. An argument is not like a bus where you can get 
off at any stop you like: once you have accepted the premises you have to follow it to the 
end of the line.  
 
A precedential logically slippery slope argument may therefore be a valid argument. 
However, this does not show that all arguments of that form are in fact valid, any more than 
all empirical slippery slope arguments are valid. As an empirical slippery slope argument will 
fail if it fails to establish a causal relationship, a precedential logical slippery slope argument 
will fail if it rests on a faulty analogy (Govier 1982, p. 305). To be valid and persuasive a 
precedential slippery slope argument will have to identify the principle in common and thus 
demonstrate that the cases are in fact relevantly similar. The remainder of this article 
examines an example of a precedential logical slippery slope argument in relation to 
euthanasia: John Keown’s argument that accepting voluntary euthanasia leads logically to 




Keown’s logical slippery slope argument 
 
In his book Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy (2002), John Keown sets out a logical 
slippery slope argument against legalising voluntary euthanasia, and then supplements this 
with evidence of an empirical slippery slope in practice. This mixing of logical and empirical 
forms of the argument produces what Govier describes as a “real slippery slope” (1982, p. 
313). Indeed Den Hartogh claims that, while “logical slippery slope arguments” are typically 
distinguished from “causal arguments” in theory, “in practice this logical form is almost 
always incorporated into a prediction” (2009, p. 322). Nevertheless, the logical slippery 
slope that Keown sets out is presented as valid independent of further empirical evidence. 
Indeed while many commentators opine that “the empirical slippery slope argument has the 
most credibility and is most often used by opponents of the legalization of euthanasia or 
assisted suicide” (Lewis 2007 p. 197) Keown regards the logical form of the slippery slope 
argument against euthanasia as “even more formidable” (2002, p. 76) than the empirical 
argument. Given the significance of empirical versions of the slippery slope argument in the 
euthanasia debate over the last fifty years, the claim that there is there is a logical slippery 
slope that is “even more formidable” certainly warrants careful examination.  
 
Keown’s version of the logical slippery slope is clearly focused. He does not attempt to show 
that legalising euthanasia will inevitably lead to the atrocities that are associated with the 
Nazis (as does Grisez 1980), nor that numbers of those killed will inevitably rise, nor that 
palliative care will inevitably suffer, nor that discrimination against the elderly or the 
disabled will inevitably increase. He does not claim that allowing voluntary euthanasia will 
necessarily lead to “involuntary” active euthanasia (IVAE), i.e. killing against the wish of the 
person who is killed.iii Keown seeks to establish only two relatively modest conclusions:  
  
(1) that “acceptance of VAE  [voluntary active euthanasia] leads to the acceptance of 
NVAE [non-voluntary active euthanasia, where the patient is unable to express 
consent]” (2002, p. 76); 
(2) and that “if the core justification of VAE is thought to be respect for patient 
autonomy, this is surely logically inconsistent with the requirement that the patient 
be suffering unbearably” (2002, p.79).  
 
Keown’s starting point for his argument is the fact that in the case of voluntary euthanasia, 
unlike suicide, what is necessary is not only the will and judgement of the patient but also 
the will and judgment of the doctor. This immediately leads to the question of why the 
doctor acquiesces in the patient’s request. Before acting, the doctor must judge the 
patient’s request to be justified such that acceding to the request would constitute a benefit 
to the patient. Crudely speaking, the doctor must decide whether to agree with the patient 
that “the patient would indeed be better off dead” (Keown 2002, p. 77). However, if the 
doctor can make such a judgement in the case of a competent patient, then the doctor can 
equally make an analogous judgement in the case of an incompetent patient. Keown 




Imagine two patients of Dr A: X and his brother Y. They are identical twins, with an 
identically painful terminal illness and suffering to an identical degree. They lie, side 
by side, in hospital. X, who is competent, pleads with Dr A for a lethal injection of 
potassium chloride because the “suffering is unbearable”. Dr A agrees that death 
would indeed be a benefit for X and agrees to administer the injection to give him a 
“merciful release”. X requests the same for his brother Y, who is incompetent, on the 
ground that he, too, must be experiencing “unbearable and useless” suffering. Is Dr 
A to deny Y the same benefit he has agreed to confer on X? If so, what has become 
of the doctor’s duty to act in the best interests of his patient? (Keown 2002, p. 78) 
 
The common feature which does the work here is the judgement that death may be a 
benefit. If death would be an overall benefit then it seems wrong to deprive someone of this 
benefit merely because he or she is not able to request it. In defence of this logical link 
between VAE and NVAE Keown states that “many leading philosophical advocates of VAE, 
such as Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse, Jonathan Glover and John Harris, also condone 
NVAE”. (Keown 2002, p.79) These advocates of euthanasia are credible witnesses to the 
logic of their own position. Keown does not provide quotations from these philosophers but 
he easily could have. For example, Jonathan Glover has argued in print that 
 
Where someone is not able to express his own view about being alive or dead, it 
may sometimes happen that we think that his life is not worth living… Once there 
are grounds for thinking that someone would be better off dead, the argument 
seems to glide disturbingly smoothly towards the conclusion that undiluted killing is 
right where weaker policies fail to bring about the same result. I do not wish to 
retreat from this view…  
(Glover 1977, p. 194, p. 201) 
 
Keown could also have quoted other less well known advocates of euthanasia such as 
Steven Neeley who, in the context of arguing that there is no slippery slope from VAE to 
IVAE, nevertheless concedes the logical link between VAE to NVAE. When the patient is not 
competent and “a situation calling for active voluntary euthanasia should present itself” 
then the decision should be “guided by the humanitarian credo of seeking to effect the will 
and best interest of the patient.” (Neeley 1994, p. 64) The key logical move, which Glover 
and Neeley are clear-sighted enough to acknowledge, is that if euthanasia is regarded as 
being in the “best interest” of a competent patient who requests it, then it can also be in 
the “best interest” of an incompetent patient who is not able to request it.  
 
Having set out an argument that acceptance of VAE implies acceptance of NVAE, Keown 
imagines an advocate of euthanasia who denies that the doctor can or should make 
judgments about whether the patient is “better off dead”. Such an advocate might assert 
that only the patient is in a position to make this judgement, in which case there would be 
no slippage to non-voluntary euthanasia. However, the price for this move is very high. For if 
the acceptance of the doctor is made not on the basis of overall benefit but only out of 
“respect for the patient self-determination” (Keown 2002, p. 79) how can this be limited to 
patients who are suffering unbearably? If the doctor cannot make a judgment as to what is 
beneficial for the patient then the doctor cannot limit euthanasia to cases of unbearable 
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suffering. The attempt to resist the move from VAE and NVAE by asserting the right of 
patients to self-determination thus leads to a second slippery slope towards including an 
ever larger category of patients not limited only to the terminally ill or those with 
“unbearably suffering”.  
 
On the basis of these two logical slippery slopes Keown concludes that while legislation 
might be framed to limit euthanasia to euthanasia “upon request” by patients experiencing 
“unbearable suffering” the justification for euthanasia “when taken to its logical conclusion”  
would apply equally to those who cannot request and to those with less severe suffering 
(Keown 2002, p. 80).  
 
Criticisms of Keown’s argument 
 
Keown has constructed two prima facie credible logical slippery slope arguments in relation 
to euthanasia: from VAE to NVAE; and from restricting VAE to “unbearable suffering” to 
allowing VAE on request. In the light of Keown’s argumentiv it is no longer sufficient merely 
to dismiss the logical slippery slope against euthanasia as “very weak” (Shand  1997, p. 45) 
without further argument, nor to  assert that “there is no logical reason to progress from VE 
to NVE” (Savulescu 2005, p. 15) or that “there is nothing logically inconsistent in supporting 
voluntary euthanasia while rejecting non-voluntary euthanasia as morally inappropriate” 
(Young 2010). Keown has presented just such a “logical reason” which, if valid, shows that it 
is indeed “logically inconsistent” to support voluntary euthanasia while resisting the move 
to non-voluntary euthanasia. If someone wishes to accept the one and oppose the other, 
and at the same time avoid the charge of logical inconsistency, then he or she must show 
the flaw in Keown’s reasoning. 
 
The challenge presented by Keown’s arguments has been taken up in two substantial 
treatments by Hallvard Lillehammer (2002) and Stephen Smith (2005). Both critics 
acknowledge the potential significance of Keown’s argument and pay him the compliment 
of constructing a detailed rebuttal. Indeed Smith goes so far as to say that “if any logical 
slippery slope argument is expected to work it is likely to be one such as Keown’s” (Smith 
2005, p. 225).  
 
Nevertheless, while these critics consider Keown’s logical slippery slope argument to be 
worthy of consideration, both argue that the argument in fact rests on a logical confusion. 
Lillehammer construes Keown’s argument as a “dilemma” (Lillehammer 2002, p. 546). Either 
it is the idea of patient benefit that really does the work, in which case there is a slippery 
slope from VAE to NVAE, or it is patient autonomy that really does the work, in which case 
there is a slippery slope from “unbearable suffering” to permitting euthanasia on request 
for any patient. However, according to Lillehammer, this dilemma is troubling only if patient 
benefit and patient autonomy are regarded as independently justifying euthanasia. For 
someone who takes both to be necessary there is no inconsistency in accepting voluntary 
euthanasia for unbearable suffering, while rejecting both non-voluntary euthanasia and 
voluntary euthanasia on request for any patient. While Lillehammer does not express this in 
terms of formal logic, his point could be made by saying that if “A and B” is true then “A and 




Smith regards Lillehammer as having exposed the fallacy at the heart of Keown’s argument:  
“Keown’s argument confuses a necessary condition with a sufficient condition” (2005, p. 
231).v 
 
Lillehammer and Smith both press the point by re-examining Keown’s illustration of the 
identical twin brothers X and Y. They portray Keown’s argument as resting on the claim that 
the doctor must treat brothers X and Y identically or be charged with inconsistency. Yet in 
reality no two human beings are so alike that treating X in one way logically commits you to 
treating patient Y in exactly the same way. “Even identical twins who are very close in many 
ways (which is presumably why the hypothetical makes the two patients twins) are not 
identical in every respect” (Smith 2005, p. 233). This is evidently the case in relation to the 
experience of suffering, which may vary greatly from one person to another. It is also the 
case that direct communication with X gives the doctor a better quality of evidence of 
suffering than he has in the case of Y where he is relying on what someone else (albeit 
someone very close to the patient) says about him. “Since we do not know what Y wants, he 
is not, nor can he be, subject to exactly the same treatment” (Smith 2005, p. 233 emphasis 
added). Patient X is also conscious of his suffering, which Y may not be, and this also, 
arguably, puts the patients in different categories. This is not to deny that the doctor might 
think the same course of action is appropriate both for X and for Y, but “this will not be for 
precisely the same reasons” (Lillehammer 2002, p. 550). Thus a doctor is not necessarily 
inconsistent if he acts differently towards X and Y.  
 
Lillehammer has proposed an elegant rebuttal of Keown which is followed in all its 
essentials by Smith. They charge Keown a logical confusion of necessary and sufficient 
conditions and use his own illustration against him to show that there are morally relevant 
differences between X (who requests euthanasia) and Y (who cannot request). However, 
while Lillehammer and Smith have shown that there are differences in these cases, this does 
nothing to undermine Keown’s claim that there is also a relevant similarity in these cases 
capable of providing a logical precedent for non-voluntary euthanasia. Furthermore, the 
counter argument of Lillehammer and Smith rests on the assertion that “both the doctor’s 
judgment and the autonomy interest of the patient are necessary to provide a sufficient 
justification”, (Smith 2005, p.232). Yet neither Lillehammer nor Smith provides an adequate 
justification for this assertion and to accept it as an axiom without further argument seems 
to beg the question.  
 
In the remainder of the present article Keown’s argument is restated to show more clearly 
that it need not fall prey to the fallacy identified by Lillehammer. The axiom invoked of 
Lillehammer and Smith is then set in the wider context of autonomy and best interests in 
medical decision making. This helps clarify the principle at work in the logical slippery slope 
from voluntary to non-voluntary euthanasia.  
 
A revised statement of Keown’s argument  
 
Smith calls attention to an important passage in which Keown characterises the relation 




Consequently, the real, rather than the rhetorical, justification for VAE is not the 
patient’s autonomous request but the doctor’s judgment that the request is justified 
because death would benefit the patient. True, in the proposals currently advanced 
by campaigners for VAE, this judgment would not be made without a prior, 
autonomous request by the patient. But even under such proposals the autonomous 
request is not decisive. It serves merely to trigger the doctor’s judgment about the 
merits of the request.  
(Keown 2002, p. 77 quoted by Smith 2005, p. 227. The emphasis is Keown’s and is 
retained by Smith.) 
 
This, as Smith rightly observes, “downplays the role of autonomy, and, in fact, reduces it to 
a rhetorical tool” (2005, p.228). No doubt Keown uses the language of “the real… 
justification” as opposed to “merely the trigger” in order to emphasise the role that the 
doctor’s judgement plays in the decision. However, by describing the role of patient 
autonomy in such dismissive language Keown overstates his case and endangers his 
conclusion. Patient autonomy has an important role in medical decision making, not only  in 
“triggering” the doctor’s decision (based on impersonal criteria) but in constituting an 
important element of the human good (and hence patient benefit). Certainly the principle of 
patient autonomy has sometimes been presented in an extreme or exaggerated way, as 
though the doctor’s role should be purely passive or mechanical (Callahan 1992). 
Nevertheless, the truth lies between these extremes and Keown’s argument neither needs 
nor is served by his rhetoric. Keown does not need to show that the doctor’s decision is 
more important than the patient’s autonomous wishes (is the “real… justification”). He only 
needs to show that the doctor’s decision necessarily involves a judgment about patient 
benefit.  
 
If the doctor’s decision to implement VAE involves a judgement that euthanasia is of overall 
benefit to the patient, then it is possible for doctors to make such judgements. However, if it 
is possible for doctors to make such judgements then it cannot be ruled impossible for the 
doctor to make such judgements in the case of non-competent patients. This does not 
imply, as Lillehammer and Smith read Keown as saying, that any two particular competent 
and non-competent patients must be treated identically. On the contrary, Lillehammer and 
Smith convincingly show that Keown’s illustration proves the contrary. Treatment of a 
competent patient will involve communication with the patient and decision-making by the 
patient. Treatment of a non-competent patient, on the other hand, will rest on a best 
interest decision by someone else on behalf of the patient. However, it is Lillehammer and 
Smith who import the language of “exactly the same treatment” (Smith 2005, p. 233) for 
“precisely the same reasons” (Lillehammer 2002, p. 550). Keown neither asserts this nor 
needs to assert this. His argument is more modest: if a swift and easy death would benefit X 
then why would it not also benefit Y? 
 
The key element of Keown’s argument thus survives the criticisms of Lillehammer and 
Smith. It is not necessary to the argument to assert that the best interest decision of a 
doctor on its own is the “real” justification to treat X and Y.  It is only necessary to assert 
that the doctor’s judgment of patient benefit plays an essential role in both decisions, and 
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that conceding the principle that “a doctor can make the judgement that the patient would 
be better off dead” will necessarily affect judgments about non-competent patients. The key 
question is not whether a doctor is obliged always to make the same judgement about X 
and Y but whether he is permitted sometimes to make the same decision. If it is possible for 
the doctor to agree with X that he is better off dead then how can it be impossible to judge 
that Y might also be better off dead? If the doctor is able to make such a judgement and to 
act on it then NVAE is acceptable in principle. Hence Keown’s argument demonstrates that 
acceptance of VAE implies acceptance in principle of NVAE.   
 
In practice, as Glover remarks, “where someone is not able to express his own view about 
being alive or dead, it may sometimes happen that we think that his life is not worth living” 
(1977, p.194). It is not difficult to imagine why someone might think this. Someone may, for 
example, think he himself would not wish to live in such conditions, or may have evidence 
that the patient previously expressed a wish not to live in such a state, or may have the 
evidence of the patient’s character from someone who knew him or her well, or perhaps all 
of the above. People are naturally uncomfortable with the idea of a doctor making a 
judgment on behalf of someone else that this person would be better off dead. 
Nevertheless, what Keown has shown convincingly is that this judgement is already implicit 
in the proposal to permit voluntary euthanasia. For a doctor must agree that euthanasia is 
indicated, and hence must make an independent judgement that death would be a benefit 
to this patient.  
 
The second slippery slope 
 
The first of Keown’s logical slippery slopes is therefore valid and can be stated in a way that 
does not involve a fallacy. However, there is a problem with the way in which Keown 
presents his second logical slippery slope argument.  The second argument starts with the 
premise that VAE is justified purely by appeal to patient autonomy and does not require a 
doctor to make a judgment about patient benefit. If this premise is accepted then this will 
indeed lead to a slippage from narrow criteria of “unbearable suffering” to acceptance of 
euthanasia on request. However, this premise is incompatible with the premise in his first 
argument. These arguments pull in opposite directions and therefore they cannot be used 
to show that acceptance of VAE will lead simultaneously to a slippery slope to NVAE and to a 
slippery slope to euthanasia on request.  
 
If there is slippage to NVAE this can only be because judgements are made about patient 
benefit, but these very judgements will counteract the second kind of logical slippery slope. 
If Keown’s argument is construed as a dilemma then at best this will show that either one 
slippery slope will occur (to NVAE) or another slippery slope will occur (to euthanasia on 
request). It cannot show that VAE will necessarily to extended “to patients who are 
incompetent and who are not suffering unbearably” (Keown 2008, p.80 emphasis added).vi   
 
More care is needed therefore about how these two arguments might relate to one 
another. The second argument is based on a premise that is incompatible with the premise 
in the first argument. Furthermore the idea that autonomy alone provided sufficient reason 
for medical intervention undermines any sense of medical care or professionalism. The 
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second horn of Keown’s dilemma in fact serves as a reductio ad absurdum of its premise. 
Construed in this way the second argument helps establish the premise for the first 
argument, that is, the necessity for a doctor’s independent judgement of patient benefit. It 
should also be noted that the premise of the logical slippery slope argument will then be 
one that is accepted by critics such Lillehammer and Smith (see also Scoccia 2005). These 
authors agree that a judgment about patient benefit is a necessary element of the 
justification of euthanasia.  
 
Keown may have evidence of an empirical slippery slope in relation to the “unbearable 
suffering” criterion, and may regard the concept of autonomy as playing a pernicious role in 
this, but he cannot appeal to a logical slippery slope to establish this while at the same time 
insisting, rightly, that VAE necessarily involves a decision about patient benefit. Thus 
Keown’s second conclusion, that there is a logical slippery slope to euthanasia on request, is 
effective only for those who accept its premise. However, if the second argument is used as 
a reductio it can buttress the premise in Keown’s primary argument, which is a premise fully 
consonant with good medical practice, and this adds cogency to the logical slippery slope 
from VAE to NVAE. Hence responding to the criticisms of Lillehammer and Smith generates 
an argument that is more cogent though narrower in its conclusion. 
 
‘Assisted dying’ and end of life medical decision making  
 
The force of Keown’s logical slippery slope can be confirmed by applying to VAE some well-
established general principles of medical decision making. In general, judgements about 
patient benefit guide the doctor in which treatments to offer patients and how to respond 
to requests for treatment (in the case of competent patients), while they justify treatment 
in the absence of consent (in the case of non-competent patients). If, for the sake of 
argument, euthanasia is classified as a legitimate form of medical assistance in dyingvii  then 
one can see how the principles of patient autonomy and patient benefit would then apply. 
 
The United Kingdom’s General Medical Council has set out a basic model for medical 
decision making which it invokes throughout much of its more specific ethical guidance. This 
basic model is helpful not because it is novel but precisely because it is not. The model gives 
expression to standards of ethical practice that are widely acknowledged in different 
jurisdictions and upheld by many different schools of moral philosophy and jurisprudence. 
The standard model is set out (GMC 2008, para 5) as follows: 
 
If patients have capacity to make decisions for themselves, a basic model applies: 
 
(a) The doctor and patient make an assessment of the patient’s condition, taking into 
account the patient’s medical history, views, experience and knowledge. 
 
(b) The doctor uses specialist knowledge and experience and clinical judgement, and 
the patient’s views and understanding of their condition, to identify which 
investigations or treatments are likely to result in overall benefit for the patient. The 
doctor explains the options to the patient, setting out the potential benefits, risks, 
burdens and side effects of each option, including the option to have no treatment. 
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The doctor may recommend a particular option which they believe to be best for the 
patient, but they must not put pressure on the patient to accept their advice. 
 
(c) The patient weighs up the potential benefits, risks and burdens of the various 
options as well as any non-clinical issues that are relevant to them. The patient 
decides whether to accept any of the options and, if so, which one. They also have 
the right to accept or refuse an option for a reason that may seem irrational to the 
doctor, or for no reason at all. 
 
(d) If the patient asks for a treatment that the doctor considers would not be of 
overall benefit to them, the doctor should discuss the issues with the patient and 
explore the reasons for their request. If, after discussion, the doctor still considers 
that the treatment would not be of overall benefit to the patient, they do not have 
to provide the treatment. But they should explain their reasons to the patient, and 




If this scheme were applied to euthanasia then it would clearly rule out IVAE as it states that 
patients “have the right to accept or refuse an option” (GMC 2008, para 5(c)). Furthermore 
the guidance states that a doctor “must not put pressure on the patient to accept” a 
particular option (para 5(b)). Nevertheless, a doctor may properly “recommend a particular 
option which they believe to be best for the patient” (para 5(b)). Thus if euthanasia were 
regarded as a legitimate medical option then it would be an option that a doctor could 
recommend and could bring up spontaneously with the patient. This is not an arbitrary 
move but is simply an implication of the premise that euthanasia could be thought of as 
beneficial and as a possible option in medical practice.  
 
The GMC guidance also brings out well the principle that doctors must “identify which 
investigations or treatments are likely to result in overall benefit for the patient” (para 5(b)). 
This shows how a doctor’s judgment of “overall benefit” plays a role in what options to 
propose and in what requests of the patient to accept. If the doctor “considers that the 
treatment would not be of overall benefit to the patient” (para 5(d)) then he or she should 
not provide the treatment. Applied to euthanasia this simply illustrates Keown’s central 
point that the doctor must make a judgement about patient benefit before agreeing to a 
request for VAE.  
 
The GMC have also provided guidance on treatment of patients who cannot consent, 
especially in the context of end of life decisions. This is complicated by the possibility that 
patients may have made advance refusals of treatments or made arrangements to appoint a 
proxy decision-maker, the legislation for which varies in different parts of the United 
Kingdom and even more between other jurisdictions. Nevertheless the overall structure of 
the decision making is of general relevance:  
 
(a) The doctor, with the patient (if they are able to contribute) and the patient’s 
carer, makes an assessment of the patient’s condition taking into account the 
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patient’s medical history and the patient and carer’s knowledge and experience of 
the condition. 
 
(b) The doctor uses specialist knowledge, experience and clinical judgement, 
together with any evidence about the patient’s views (including advance statements, 
decisions or directives), to identify which investigations or treatments are clinically 
appropriate and are likely to result in overall benefit for the patient. 
 
(f) In circumstances in which there is no legal proxy with authority to make a 
particular decision for the patient, and the doctor is responsible for making the 
decision, the doctor must consult with members of the healthcare team and those 
close to the patient (as far as it is practical and appropriate to do so) before reaching 
a decision. When consulting, the doctor will explain the issues; seek information 
about the patient’s circumstances; and seek views about the patient’s wishes, 
preferences, feelings, beliefs and values. The doctor may also explore which options 
those consulted might see as providing overall benefit for the patient, but must not 
give them the impression they are being asked to make the decision. The doctor 
must take the views of those consulted into account in considering which option 
would be least restrictive of the patient’s future choices and in making the final 
decision about which option is of overall benefit to the patient. 
 
(i) If a legal proxy or other person involved in the decision making asks for a 
treatment to be provided which the doctor considers would not be clinically 
appropriate and of overall benefit to the patient, the doctor should explain the basis 
for this view and explore the reasons for the request. If after discussion the doctor 
still considers that the treatment would not be clinically appropriate and of overall 
benefit, they are not obliged to provide it. However, as well as explaining the 
reasons for their decision, the doctor should explain to the person asking for the 
treatment the options available to them. These include the option of seeking a 
second opinion, applying to the appropriate statutory body for a review (Scotland), 
and applying to the appropriate court for an independent ruling. 
 
(GMC 2010, para 16. Subsections (c)-(e) and (g)-(h) are here omitted as these 
concern technical and legal provisions on advance decisions and proxies which vary 
from place to place and do not alter the overall shape of the decision making 
process.) 
 
It can be seen that this decision-making process reflects a significant portion of the decision-
making process that occurs with competent patients. As in the case of competent patients, 
the doctor identifies options that may “result in overall benefit for the patient” (GMC 2010, 
para 16(b)). The doctor involves carers or others close to the patient in the decision because 
they may have knowledge of the patient’s “wishes, preferences, feelings, beliefs and values” 
(para 16(f)). These are relevant because the judgment of overall benefit is not purely a 
matter of impersonal clinical factors, but also, for example, of how much of a benefit or a 




In the absence of the patient’s own decision someone has to decide and this responsibility 
generally falls to the doctor, with assistance from carers or, if one has been appointed, to a 
proxy-decision maker. The doctor makes a decision based on a judgment of “overall 
benefit”. If someone else (a carer, a relative, or a proxy) makes a request on behalf of the 
patient this is treated analogously to a request from the patient: it also is subject to the 
“overall benefit” judgment of the doctor. If the doctor does not think the option would be of 
overall benefit he or she does not have to provide it.  
 
If euthanasia were to be regarded as a legitimate medical option in end of life care, then ex 
hypothesi it would be an option that would sometimes be regarded as resulting in “overall 
benefit” to the patient. This judgment would be necessary if a doctor were to accede to a 
patient’s request for VAE. However, the very same judgment would permit NVAE. The 
fundamental logic of medical decision-making, as seen in documents such as the guidance 
of the General Medical Council, confirms the validity of Keown’s logical slippery slope 
argument. A justification for VAE must involve a decision that euthanasia is of “overall 
benefit” and a decision that euthanasia is of “overall benefit” will be sufficient to justify 
NVAE in some cases. 
 
Smith asserts that “both the doctor’s judgment and the autonomy interest of the patient 
are necessary to provide a sufficient justification [for euthanasia]”, (Smith 2005, p.232). This 
seems to imply that judgments of benefit in the absence of an autonomous request are 
contrary to respect for the patient’s “autonomy interest”. However, when the patient 
cannot request an option and has made no advance statement or plan in this regard then it 
cannot be contrary to autonomy to act for the patient on the basis of overall benefit. It is 
arbitrary to withhold from patients who cannot request an intervention which has been 
conceded to be of overall benefit to them. The logic of Keown’s slippery slope argument is 
simply that “A and B” implies B. If euthanasia is justified by autonomy and benefit to the 
patient then it can be of benefit to the patient, and this will be of practical relevance when a 
person is not in a position to exercise autonomy. 
 
The validity of this logical slippery slope argument does not, of course, decide the issue of 
whether it is right or wise to legalise voluntary euthanasia. Faced with the valid conclusion 
that VAE implies NVAE someone has two options: either to accept both together or to reject 
both together. As Michael Gillette observes,  
 
the slippery slope is a tool for clarifying the implications of our views. Either the 
slippery slope opens our eyes and forces us to accept as right some things that 
initially seemed untenable, or it shows us the unreasonableness of our initial, 
unreflective view.  
(Gillette2002)  
 
What the logical slippery slope argument rules out is the supposition that we could allow 
the first step without committing ourselves to the conclusion. To reiterate: an argument is 
not like a bus where you can get off at any stop you like, once you have accepted the 
premises you have to follow it to the end of the line. If voluntary euthanasia were accepted 
as a legitimate form of medical assistance in dying it would also be acceptable for non-
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competent patients. Keown’s argument has indeed “raised the stakes in the euthanasia 
debate” (Lillehammer 2002, p. 546). Either an advocate of legalising VAE must bite the 
bullet and also accept NVAE or, if NVAE is regarded as too dangerous or unpalatable, this is 
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i For an assessment of arguments and evidence presented in Williams’ book on these various different issues 
see Keown and Jones 2008. 
ii Other cultural factors have also emerged which have affected the debate, not least the rise of the palliative 
care and hospice movement and of the disability rights movement, both of which have been sources of 
opposition to euthanasia. Nevertheless, the place of slippery slope arguments in the debate continues to be 
central. 
iii It is important to notice that Keown’s argument establishes a logical link only between VAE and NVAE. It 
does not establish a link between VAE and IVAE (as Lillehammer recognises 2002, p. 547, n.6). Indeed Keown’s 
argument reinforces the difference between NVAE and IVAE. In the case of IVAE someone is killed against his 
or her express wishes. This clearly contradicts the principle of autonomy. However, the treatment of non-
competent patients in accordance with their overall benefit (including, ex hypothesi, NVAE) is not contrary to 
patient autonomy, as autonomy is not in play and the doctor has to rely on overall benefit as a guide.  
 
iv Calling this “Keown’s argument” is not to deny that versions of the argument have been presented before; 
for example by Kass (1989), Callahan (1991) (see McCarrick 1992), and Gormally (1995) whom Keown 
acknowledges. A similar argument is also given by Amarasekara and Bagaric (2004) on the basis of juris 
prudential considerations. Nevertheless Keown has produced a usefully clear statement of the argument 
which has attracted detailed criticism. 
v The same argument in its essentials occurs in Battin (1998, p. 26) Dworkin (1998, p. 10), prior to Keown, and 
is reiterated by Griffiths (2008, p. 514).  
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vi Of course different sections of the public, politicians and doctors could slip down different slopes, so that in 
society as a whole there could be slippage in both directions, but whether or not this happened would be a 
contingent empirical question, not a matter of logic. Logically Keown offers us a choice of two slopes.  
vii It should be noted that this premise is fiercely disputed, as euthanasia is often criticized for being 
incompatible with the ethos of medicine, for example by Kass (1989), Capron (1992), Jones (2007, pp.205-212).  
However, this is to engage in a different kind of argument: not about slippery slopes but about the morality of 
euthanasia per se, the role of the physician and the nature of medicine. A slippery slope argument, like a 
reductio ad absurdum, concedes a premise for the sake of argument to see what then would follow.  
